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ABTRACT
Indonesian financial sector supervision, including the Capital Market 
is done by the Otoritas Jasa Keuangan/OJK (Financial Services 
Authority). Capital market is a market driven by the coming of new 
information. The punctuality and accuration of information are the 
key for an efficient capital market. The OJK structure and internal 
process makes us understand why OJK is weak, slow, permissive and 
error-tolerant to erroneousness. This condition is exploited by issuers/
listed companies, including, banking sector companies, ignoring the 
carefulness rules in delivering the disclosure obligation. It explicitly 
comes up from most of the correction and revision toward disclosures 
they have made or even not doing the disclosure obligation. Worse, the 
audited anual financial which have accepted and legalized by General 
Meeting of Shareholders and therefore receive acquit et de charge, 
is rectified for restatement reason.It seems that the OJK failed to 
understand and stutter against forms of non-compliance and old crime 
in the new structure, in the form of omission, for investors this failure 
was a form of impartiality to them. OJK should act as an investor’s 
advocate, not an issuer carer. In addition to the silo structure, there 
is an incompatibility of the investigation function with the provisions 
regarding the investigation in accordance with the Criminal Procedure 
Code and other deficiency.
Keyword: Disclosures; Financial; Information value; Scandal; 
Supervision.
1. INTRODUCTION
On supervision...the main remaining 
challenges to effective supervision stem.... 
and OJK’s capacity to supervise them, silos in 
OJK’s internal structure and an insufficiently 
intrusive supervisory approach across sectors 
(IMF2017). This is the quote from IMF 
recomendation on the Financial System 
Stability Assessment.  The structure 
example similar to silo is already self 
explained in 2014, when POJK No.34/
POJK.04/2014 about Nomination and 
Renumeration Comittee was issued. It 
gives choices to listed companies in the 
capital market to establish Nomination 
and Remuneration Comittee or if not, 
its function will be held by the board of 
commissioners. As for banks, through 
Bank of Indonesia Regulation Number 
8/4/PBI/2006 on Implementation 
of Good Corporate Governance for 
Commercial Banks as amended through 
Bank of Indonesia Regulation Number 
8/14/PBI/2006 on Amendments to Bank 
of Indonesia Regulation Number 8/4/
PBI/2006 on the Implementation of Good 
Corporate Governance for Commercial 
Banks, the existence of these committee is 
absolute.
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Table 1 is an tabulation of listed 
companies that make mistakes and 
announce them as revisions, corrections 
or rectifies. There are countless corrections 
and revisions to the implementation of 
the obligations disclosures, the types vary 
from mild; changes in the distribution of 
dividends schedule, to very heavy ones; 
rectifying the Annual Report while the 
Annual Report has been accounted for 
at the General Meeting of Shareholders 
(hereinafter referred to as GMS and/or 
RUPS, interchangeably). Corrections and 
revisions to information disclosure as a 
result of carelessness have become relatively 
better, compared to issuers who secretly 
hide violations. Meanwhile Table 2 and 
Table 3 are companies that do not comply 
with Regulation No. X. K. 2 on Obligation 
to Submit Periodic Financial Reports by 
not submitting Audited Financial Reports.
The delay in the submission of audited 
annual financial reports for thirty days, 
certainly has implications for the delay 
in the availability and delivery of annual 
reports, the deadline is the end of the 
fourth month since closing the book.
In addition, there are also types of 
information that are micro in nature, 
such as based on the provisions of POJK 
No 55/POJK.04/2015 concerning the 
Establishment and Work Guidelines of the 
Audit Committee, the Audit Committee 
must be chaired by an Independent 
Commissioner and consisting of 
independent parties. But it turns out there 
are still public companies whose audit 
committees consist of commissioners or 
directors in affiliated companies.Another 
example is one of the SOE (hereinafter 
referred to as SOE or BUMN, used 
interchangeably) listed company whose 
Golden Share or Dwi Warna share are 
affected by the stock split so that there 
are five Dwi Warna shares in the issuer. 
Whereas based on POJK No. 21 Year 2015 
concerning the Implementation of Public 
Company Governance Guidelines, of 
course OJK has received the Company’s 
Articles of Association, Board Manual, 
Charter of Audit Committees and Internal 
Audit Charter, from which OJK will be 
able to know, right/wrong, proper or not.
Surely, it is unappropriate for a SOE to 
issue four additional Dwi Warna Shares. 
Even though in 2018 OJK has created an 
Electronic Reporting System which is 
an information system that is used as a 
means of delivering Reports electronically 
by Issuers or Public Companies to the 
Financial Services Authority (POJK No 7 
Year 2018 Regarding Report Submission 
Through Issuer’s Electronic Reporting 
System Or Public Company), seems to be 
ineffective, because the problem is not a 
matter of facilities and media, but a matter 
of compliance. As long as there is no 
enforcement rule, the comply or explain 
mechanism will not work.
The year 2018 was marked by the 
disclosure of two cases of corporate 
financial statements, namely the audited 
financial statements of Bank Bukopin 
(BBKP) and Sunprima Nusantara 
Pembiayaan (SNP), both of which were 
regulated and supervised by the OJK. 
BBKP is regulated and supervised by the 
OJK as a bank and as a public company 
while the SNP is regulated and supervised 
by the OJK as a finance company. One 
of them made corrections to the audited 
2015 and 2016 financial statements that 
were retroactive. Whereas, on the financial 
statements that have been accepted 
by the GMS, they have been granted 
acquit et de charges, dividends have 
also been distributed. The company did 
not announce that restatement had been 
carried out. The party outside the company 
that knows the first time a restatement has 
occurred is not an OJK or an Exchange but 
rather from the capital market community.
Whereas OJK through Article 20 of POJK 
No. 13 Year 2017 concerning the Use of 
Public Accountant Services and Public 
Accounting Firms in Financial Service 
Activities, OJK should receive incidental 
reports from the Public Accountant Office 
or vice versa, the Public Accountant 
Office must report to OJK if there are (1) 
significant violations of the provisions of 
the laws and regulations carried out by 
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the Party Implementing Financial Service 
Activities; (2) significant weaknesses in 
the control of the process of preparing and 
presenting the financial statements of the 
Parties Implementing Financial Service 
Activities; (3) significant weaknesses in the 
internal control of the party that carries 
out financial service activities; and/or 
(4) conditions or estimates of conditions 
that could endanger the continuity of 
the business of the party that carries out 
financial service activities.This finding later 
became gossip through the mass media 
and social media. Until here, the main 
tasks and functions of the OJK to regulate 
and supervise need to be questioned. The 
restatement case of the company’s audited 
annual financial statements is threefold 
or fourfold scandal which has wide and 
widespread implications everywhere, 
which until the writing is completed there 
has been no resolution. OJK pretends there 
are no problems. Share holders who took 
the vote at the GMS also did not question 
it. The second case is a case of financial 
engineering of a finance company which 
then causes losses to banks that purchase 
Medium Term Notes issued by the finance 
company.The conditions as I said above are 
examples of bad seeds for the development 
of the Indonesian capital market which 
should be zero tolerance towards it. 
The inaccuracy and unreliability of the 
reporting system, including financial 
statements, is the beginning of an outbreak 
of Enron, WorldCom cases and others that 
have created a crisis of confidence in the 
information conveyed by issuers in the 
capital market.The United States has to 
enact the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), whose 
preamble reads “to protect investors by 
improving the accuracy and reliability 
of corporate securities, and for other 
purposes”.Weak rule enforcement efforts 
can be explained in the context of long-
term relationships between companies and 
politicians who are relied on by companies. 
This long-term relationship can generate 
increased pressure from politicians to the 
SEC. Companies can also use political 
contributions to signal willingness to resist 
SEC decision rule enforcement. Using data 
before and after the promulgation of SOX, 
namely GAO database from 1996 to June 
2002 and the Glass Lewis database for the 
period June 2002 to December 2007, there 
is a positive correlation between political 
connections and SEC enforcement (Correia 
2017). Transparency International, which 
measures and ranks 2017 Corruption 
Perception Index from 180 countries with 
a score scale of 0 to 100, the United States 
which ranks 16 with a score of 75, can 
be statistically proven to have a positive 
correlation between SEC rule enforcement 
and political connections. How about 
Indonesia which in rank of 96 and has 
scores of 37?
Opening the “listed company 
information disclosure” page on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange website, with 
the keywords “correction” or “revision” 
or “corrective” will be found dozens of 
issuers who have the habit of making 
corrections, corrections and revisions. The 
important thing is to fulfill the reporting 
deadline first, if wrong or caught wrong, 
make corrections and corrections later.
So cheap are corrections and corrections 
that they are scattered about information 
openness with a “correction” or “revision” 
or “erroneous” suffix, as if correction of 
information has no financial implications. 
The first nine months of 2018, which 
ended on September 30, 2018 alone, have 
had forty-three revisions or corrections 
to information disclosures from the mild, 
such as revisions to the schedule of bonus 
share distribution until the revision of 
longform financial statements. Whereas 
throughout 2017 there were thirty-four 
and in 2016 there were thirty revisions 
or corrections to information disclosure. 
Jumping to conclusion, there appears 
to be an effect of tolerance for errors in 
information disclosure. Error-tolerant has 
encouraged issuers to meet the deadline for 
information disclosure, if there is an error, 
there will be an opportunity to rectify.
Up to this point, if today a survey 
is made for the analysts and fund 
managers by asking questions: (1) do 
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you feel confident about the accuracy 
of information disclosure from the 
issuer? and (2) do you think information 
disclosure is reliable? I guess the result is 
negative.My guess goes from the results of 
a survey conducted thirteen years ago on 
the United States market to 401 CFOs, 78% 
among respondents consciously willing 
to sacrifice company value for income 
smoothing (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal: 
2005).This is understandable because 
the remuneration system such as giving 
bonuses, tantieme, and other monetary 
rewards is based more on profit targets 
achieving. Whereas in the banking sector for 
example, the decision to give a loan today 
will only have an impact in the coming 
year. Realizing this, the Financial Stability 
Board (2009) published the FSB Principles 
for Sound Compensation Practices. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions 
must follow it by making arrangements 
that are absolutely adopted by member 
countries of the three organizations. In 
Indonesia, implementation in the form 
of new regulations was implemented for 
the banking sector, through the Financial 
Services Authority Regulation No. 45 Year 
2015 concerning the Implementation of 
Governance in Providing Remuneration 
for Commercial Banks.
2. METHOD
This research is a qualitative research. 
Primary data is obtained from the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange website. Secondary data 
is obtained from books, articles, and both 
print and online.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Each Capital Market Law in the world 
always makes the phrase “realize the 
creation of regular, fair and efficient 
Capital Market activities and protect the 
interests of investors and the public” as 
both the ideals and raison d’etre of the 
Law and its supervisory institutions. 
Guidance, regulation and supervision by 
the Law were made the main tasks and 
functions of the establishment of capital 
market supervisors. The preamble of the 
founding of the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions (IOSCO: 2003) 
confirms the thirty basic principles of capital 
market regulation and supervision which 
depart from the three main objectives of 
regulation, namely: (1) investor protection 
(2) achieving fair, efficient and transparent 
markets; (3) systematic risk reduction.
The capital market is driven by the 
arrival of every new information, the 
valuation of the company will change 
because of new information, the valuation 
of the company will be executed by the 
actors to form prices on the market. For 
this reason, in the field of finance, research 
on the efficient market hypothesis must 
be information-based. From it, it is then 
known as weak form, semi strong and 
strong form hypothesis of capital market.
Information on the capital market can 
be distinguished from information that 
is generated instantaneously from the 
trading of stocks or bonds on the stock 
exchange and the type of information 
that comes from listed companies. The 
first type of information is information 
about the price, volume and frequency of 
transactions. While information coming 
from companies can be distinguished from 
information that comes when companies 
conduct public offerings through an initial 
mandatory disclosures mechanism. After 
the company has completed the public 
offering and its securities are listed on the 
stock exchange, companies are required 
to submit information originating from 
the mechanism of continuing disclosures. 
The type of information on continuing 
disclosures is distinguished from 
information that comes from periodical 
disclosures and incidental disclosures 
from issuers. The range of periodical 
disclosures includes quarterly interim 
financial statements; middle of the year; 
annual financial report, report on the use 
of funds resulting from public offering, 
etc. Whereas incidental disclosures are 
all types of information or material facts 
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are important or relevant information 
or facts regarding events, events or facts 
that can affect the price of securities on 
the stock exchange and / or decisions of 
investors, prospective investors, or other 
parties with an interest in information 
or facts that is. Validity and reliability 
Initial disclosures are the responsibility 
of issuers and professions and capital 
market supporting institutions, tested first 
by capital market supervisors through 
the mechanism of registration statement 
submission. If the supervisor feels enough, 
then the registration statement is given an 
effective statement. Based on its nature, 
what is always awaited is information that 
is categorized as continuing disclosures. 
Because of this nature, I call disclosures as 
the main capital market doctrine, anything 
can be done on the capital market as long 
as it is preceded or followed by fulfilment 
of disclosures obligation (Haikal 2011)
The arrival of new information is 
always eagerly awaited, so that gossip, 
rumors, leakage of inside information is 
also valid new information in moving 
the market. Buy on rumors sell on fact! 
A mantra of collusion between Peter N. 
Brant, stock broker of Kidder Peabody, 
and R. Foster Winans, columnist of “Heard 
on the Street” in The Wall Street Journal 
(Lynch and Missal: 1985), shows how new 
information comes every time, the market 
will immediately react with investment or 
divestment decisions. The arrival of every 
new information on the capital market is 
awaited by every parties, from traders, 
research analysts, to fund managers. 
Analysts prepare financial projections 
based on historical data together with 
other information such as economic, 
industrial data, information from the 
company visit, analyst’s meeting. If the 
information used by garbage information, 
the quality of its recommendations is also 
a recommendation for waste. The fund 
manager also underlies information-based 
decision making, if the information used 
is information that is corrected later in 
the day, then the decision that has been 
taken must also be corrected. The problem 
is the analyst’s recommendation and 
the decision taken by the fund manager 
contains the value of money. So that any 
correction of information originating from 
the source, also means a loss is worth the 
money as well. 
The capital market in Indonesia, by 
age is old because it has existed since 
the Dutch East Indies government in the 
19th century, is the fourth oldest stock 
exchange in Asia after Mumbay, Hong 
Kong and Tokyo, but for forty years 
hibernating because of World War I and II 
and the economy after the independence 
of Indonesia which was marked by 
hyperinflation, it was only in 1977 that 
the capital market was reactivated. The 
Capital Market Supervisor in Indonesia 
in 1977 was the Executing Agency and 
Capital Market Supervisor (Bappepam). 
The 1977 to 1995 period was a period 
when the capital market operated without 
the Capital Market Law even without the 
Limited Liability Company Law. In 1995 
both laws were issued and took effect 
through Law No. 1 of 1995 concerning 
Limited Liability Companies and Law 
No. 8 of 1995 concerning Capital Markets. 
So that practically, if calculated from the 
law administered, namely Law No. 8 of 
1995, the Indonesian capital market is 
only 23 years old. Bappepam, which is the 
regulator and capital market supervisor, 
has transformed into the Financial 
Services Authority (OJK) in 2013 after 
previously transforming into Bapepam-
LK. The purpose of the integration of the 
Capital Market Supervisory Agency with 
Supervision of Financial Institutions to 
become Bapepam LK and then integration 
with supervision of Banking to become the 
Financial Services Authority is to eliminate 
no man’s land which is a gray area in 
regulation and supervision.
Although Law No. 8 of 1995 concerning 
the Capital Market is ancient but the 
articles governing capital market criminal 
matters related to disclosure (disclosures) 
remain up to date and relevant, even 
though in its development there are types 
of recent cases that are status quo. The new 
Asia Pacific Fraud Journal, 4(1) January-June 2019: 78-95 | 83
crimes in old structures like this turned 
out to be faced by the United States as a 
developed country and became the world 
financial market center  (NASEM: 2018). 
Capital market supervisors cannot rely 
solely on the Capital Market Law. Because 
those who are eligible to issue equity 
securities (shares) and bonds are only 
business entities incorporated as Limited 
Liability Companies, the capital market 
supervisors must make the Capital Market 
Law as a supplement, not a substitution of 
the Limited Liability Company Law. Why? 
Because CORPORATION n. An ingenious 
device for obtaining individual profits without 
individual responsibility.
Naturally there is no company law 
that has phrases or terms of investors 
and creditors. Because the company 
law is intended to provide protection to 
shareholders, what is certain is the term 
shareholders. For practicality, shareholders 
who can use the inherent rights of their 
shares are limited by a threshold. In Law 
No. 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability 
Companies, for example, the threshold is 
ten percent. This means that shareholders 
or a group of shareholders who gather 
but whose ownership is less than ten 
percent will never be able to use their 
rights to propose a GMS, propose a GMS 
agenda, nominate someone to become a 
director or commissioner. Shareholders 
whose ownership is less than ten percent, 
almost certainly own shares by buying 
company shares in the capital market 
whose supervision is carried out based on 
the Capital Market Law and carried out by 
capital market supervisors.
If this understanding is well 
comprehend by every capital market 
supervisor, then the financial market 
scandals are not stand alone but depart 
from the existence of corporate crime 
that starts from the weak internal control 
of the company rooted in poor corporate 
governance. Because the company issues 
and sells shares through a public offering 
mechanism in the primary market, the 
capital market supervisor must protect 
shareholders, including those who buy 
them on the secondary market through the 
stock exchange. Most of these shareholders 
become minority shareholders and are 
often referred to as free float.
Based on market regulation, there 
are two main types of fraud related to 
information on the capital market, namely 
information misrepresentation and 
fraudulent financial reporting (also known 
as earnings management fraud). In the 
capital market, fraud and misrepresentation 
are often used interchangeably, although 
both have different meanings. In order 
not to become an etymology debate, I 
did not refer to the definition of fraud, 
but chose to use the meaning of financial 
scandal. According to Mirriam Webster 
online, scandal has a number of meanings: 
“Conduct that causes or encourages a 
lapse of faith or of religious obedience in 
another”; “Loss to or damage to reputation 
is caused by actual violation of morality 
or propriety”; “A situation or action that 
offends propriety or established moral 
concepts or disgraces those associated 
with it”; “A person whose conduct offends 
propriety or morality”. The first two 
definitions contain the religiousword, as 
virtue which is dogma, while the other two 
definitions are more mundane. Although 
it doesn’t define specifically, what scandal 
is, Erhard and Jensen (2017) write that .... 
the seemingly never-ending scandals in 
the world of finance, accompanied by their 
damaging effects on value and human 
welfare ... implied that scandal has a bad 
impact on human values  and well-being.
Chapter X of the Capital Market Law 
which consists of 5 articles governing 
Reporting and Information (disclosure). 
The two paragraphs in article 86 define 
and regulate periodical disclosures and 
incidental disclosures. In addition to these 
two types of disclosures, article 87 also 
regulates other types of disclosures, namely 
ownership of securities by company 
managers and ownership of securities that 
need to be reported because they reach a 
five percent threshold. Chapter XI of this 
Law consists of ten articles governing 
Fraud, Market Manipulation and Insider 
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Trading. In the articles of Chapter XI 
there are still arrangements regarding 
information. For example letter (c) article 
90, which reads: “makes false statements 
about material facts or does not disclose 
material facts so that statements made are 
not misleading about the circumstances 
that occur when the statement is made 
with the intention to benefit or avoid 
loss for oneself or other Party or with the 
aim of influencing other Parties to buy 
or sell Securities”. Information has also 
been interpreted not only in the form of 
statements, but includes the creation of 
images, as stipulated in Article 91: “Every 
Party is prohibited from taking actions, 
directly or indirectly, with the aim of 
creating a false or misleading picture of 
trading activities , market conditions, or 
prices of Securities in the Stock Exchange 
“, as well as Article 92:” Every Party, 
both individually and jointly with other 
Parties, is prohibited from conducting 2 
(two) or more Securities transactions, both 
directly and indirectly, causing the price of 
Securities in the Stock Exchange to remain, 
rise, or decrease with the aim of influencing 
other Parties to buy, sell or hold Securities 
“. Article 93 returns to information 
regulation an sich, namely: “Every Party 
is prohibited, in any way, from making a 
statement or providing information that 
is materially incorrect or misleading so 
that it affects the price of Securities on the 
Stock Exchange if at the time the statement 
is made or the statement is given: (a) The 
party concerned knows or duly knows 
that such statement  is materially incorrect 
or misleading; or (b) The party concerned 
is not careful enough in determining the 
material truth of the statement. Article 93 
has been used to provide administrative 
sanctions (only) to the Directors of PT 
Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero), Tbk in 
2007. The other six articles in Chapter XI 
concern the inside information and insider 
trading.
Corrections and revisions to 
information disclosure are a result of 
inaccuracies in the substance of the 
information announced, such as the 
revision of bonus share distributions 
(NISP: 7 March 2018) to the heaviest such as 
revisions to long-form financial statements 
(BBRI: 11 May 2018), or revisions annual 
report (BBTN: June 22, 2017) meets the 
criteria of “making false statements about 
material facts”. The BBKP case until the date 
of this writing, in fact has never carried out 
the disclosure obligation at all that there 
have been restatment of audited financial 
statements for 2015 and 2016. Utilizing the 
lazy reading culture, the restatement is 
stated in the audited financial statements 
themselves. Corrections and corrections 
to 2016 financial statements are known 
not by the OJK (both from the elements of 
banking supervision and from the elements 
of capital market supervision) and the 
Exchange. BBKP fulfills the element of 
“not disclosing material facts”. 
Financial report scandals are not 
something that has just happened, 
previously it happened in Indonesia starting 
from earnings management practices as in 
the KAEF case, which based on the results 
of a 2002 Bapepam examination found 
evidence that the income ended December 
31, 2001 was reported to have overstated 
IDR 32.7 billion . Similarly, INAF in 2004 
because the company reported overstated 
inventories of IDR 28.87 billion and 
understated basic prices of IDR 28.8 
billion so that profits were overstated 
by IDR 28.8 billion. Such cases at that 
time really shocked the capital market, 
and proved that fraudulent financial 
statements have a close relationship with 
earnings management (Handayani, Tarjo, 
Rimawati: 2016)
Similar but not the same as the BBKP 
case, exceeding the complexity of the 
KAEF and INAF financial report scandals. 
This case stems from the correction of the 
company’s current year comprehensive 
income from originally Rp 2,290,880 million 
(2016 FY) to the 2016 financial statements 
to Rp 1,376,735 million (2016 FY) presented 
in 2017 financial statements or a decrease 
of 40%. If the sequence in longform note 
51 is found, the explanation is as follows: 
“In 2017, the Bank restated its consolidated 
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financial statements on 31 December 2016 
and 1 January 2016/31 December 2015, 
and for the year ending 31 December 
2016, in connection with the correction 
of presentation errors on: (i) Bank credit 
card receivables caused by modification 
of certain credit card data, and (ii) Islamic 
financing/ receivables in the subsidiary 
of Bank Syariah Bukopin related to the 
additional balance of Allowance for 
Impairment Losses (therinafter CKPN) 
for certain debtors. The BBKP scandal 
raises doubts about two things at once: 
(1) doubts about data integrity, because of 
the misstatement of credit card receivables 
caused by modification of data, then 
the integrity of the data for the previous 
years and the following years is worth 
questionable, why need to be modified? (2) 
If the addition of certain debtor Allowance 
for Impairment Losses balances on 
Islamic finance is only known one or two 
years after the event, then the quality of 
internal controls and parent relations with 
subsidiaries also needs to be doubted.
The BBKP case is more accurately 
referred to as acquit et de charge trap. The 
BBKP financial report scandal is complex 
and complicated because the 2015 financial 
statements have been accounted for at the 
2016 GMS and 2016 financial statements 
have been accounted for at the 2017 GMS 
and have been accepted by the GMS and 
therefore the GMS has issued a verdict of 
acquit et de charge. Based on the decision to 
accept the accountability of 2016 financial 
statements, the GMS has also decided to 
distribute 30% of the dividend from Rp 
1,086,605 million (Rp 325,982 million) as 
cash dividends and 70% from Rp 1,086,605 
million as retained earnings (Rp 760,624 
million).
If changes in accounts receivable due 
to modification of credit card data and 
the addition of CKPN are caused due to 
accounting policies or due to changes in 
accounting treatment, then it is impossible 
to be retroactive. Why is this: (1) the 2015 
annual financial statements and the 2016 
annual financial statements have been 
accounted for by the Directors to the GMS. 
The 2016 AGMS, and the 2017 AGMS have 
provided acquit de charge, to the Board 
of Directors and Board of Commissioners. 
After the correction, mathematically 
there was an excess pay dividend of Rp. 
270,921 million and the excess of recording 
retained earnings of Rp. 632,148 million 
would the shareholders who had received 
the dividend have to return it? Of course 
not, because the regulation of dividend 
returns regulated in Article 72 of the PT 
Law is interim dividends while the final 
dividend may be an interim dividend. If (1) 
all shareholders refuse to return dividends 
(2) there is no obligation to pay dividends; 
then the Board of Directors and Board of 
Commissioners are jointly responsible for 
returning it. The impact of restatement 
is indeed everywhere, one of which is a 
decrease in the value of the core capital of 
the bank concerned.
In this context, the revaluation of 
assets that have been implemented and 
the rights issuance plan are acknowledged 
to replenish the decline in core capital. As 
a result, ultimately the shareholders must 
bear the carelessness of the company’s 
management. This is unfair and unjust. 
What about bonuses and insentive or 
all variable salary components received 
by the Directors and Commissioners? 
As per sethe FSB Principles for Sound 
Compensation Practices that have been 
adopted by OJK through POJK No. 45 Year 
2015 on Implementation of Governance in 
Providing Remuneration for Commercial 
Banks, all provisions regarding clawback 
(return of all variable remuneration 
components) for remuneration already 
accepted applies, as well as the provisions 
regarding malus (the delay of all variable 
remuneration components) for the 
remuneration to be accepted also applies. 
Changes in accounts receivable due to 
modification of credit card data and the 
addition of CKPN due to accounting 
policies or due to changes in accounting 
treatment, it is impossible to be retroactive. 
Retroactivity is given so that the financial 
statements continue to receive unqualified 
opinions which means that the interests 
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of the directors as auditees are not for the 
benefit of shareholders. KAP assigned 
to audit financial statements “forgets”, 
or “does not know” that the authority to 
appoint KAP is the domain of the GMS 
which selection and election process is 
delegated to the Board of Commissioners. 
Therefore, it should comply with Article 20 
POJK No. 13 Year 2017 on the Use of Public 
Accountant Services and Public Accounting 
Firms in Financial Services Activities, KAP 
reports to the OJK and reports cases of 
misstatement (i) Receivables credit card 
bank caused by modifications certain 
credit card data, and (ii) sharia financing/
receivables in a subsidiary of Bank Syariah 
Bukopin related to the addition of the 
balance of certain debtor Impairment 
Losses (CKPN) in the 2015 and 2016 
financial year to shareholders through a 
GMS mechanism requested through the 
Board of Commissioners.
Article 66 of the PT Law requires 
directors and commissioners to submit an 
Annual Report to the GMS. The annual 
report is an Audited Financial Report 
plus management discussion and analysis. 
This annual report must be approved 
and legalized by the General Meeting of 
Shareholders. After being approved and 
legalized, the GMS will present “acquit et 
de charge” to the Board of Directors and 
the Board of Commissioners. From the 
Black Law Dictionary (online), “acquit et de 
charge” is interpreted as “to set free, release 
or discharge from an obligation, duty, liability, 
burden, or from accusation or charge”. This 
implies that the directors will no longer be 
sued to be responsible for the loss of the 
company. It should be borne in mind that 
(1) that the acquit et de charge only applies 
to legal actions of the board of directors 
that have been reported or reflected in 
the annual report and the report has been 
received by the AGM. On the contrary, the 
legal actions of the board of directors that 
are not reported or reflected in the annual 
report, become personal responsibility 
with all legal consequences (2) acquit et de 
charge will only provide civil liability and 
repayment, while the legal actions of the 
directors are criminal not included and 
therefore cannot be given acquit et de charge. 
Thus, it means that the directors must be 
responsible for criminal acts committed 
by them, both for and on behalf of the 
company, so that the company cannot be 
blamed. In the context of the BBKP, there 
is clear actus reus. Now the OJK needs to 
develop the mens rea argument. To develop 
the mens rea argument it is necessary to 
make a boundary between accidental 
events (from negligence to reckless) or 
intentional events (intention).
3. RESEARCH RESULT AND 
DISCUSSION
IOSCO (2005) has identified seven 
separate areas that have a prominent 
role in various financial scandals in the 
capital market, three of which are: (1) 
corporate governance, including the role 
of independent directors in companies, 
board of directors, protection of minority 
shareholders, importance of independent 
auditor oversight committee, and 
mechanism to protect conflicts of interest 
presented by related party transactions; (2) 
auditors and audit standards, including 
auditor independence, effectiveness of 
audit standards and auditor oversight, 
and problems related to the auditor’s 
mandatory rotation; (3) issuer’s disclosure 
requirements, including discussion and 
management analysis, material events and 
factors that might affect the company.
1. OJK, a Financial Supervision Authority 
without Authority?
Regarding the  BBKP financial 
statements, there was no OJK official 
statement found either on Press 
Releases or Other Announcements, 
but in the case of financial statement 
engineering PT Sunprima Nusantara 
Finance (PT SNP), on 1 October 2018 the 
OJK gave administrative sanctions in 
the form of cancellation of registration 
to Public Accountants Marlinna, 
Public Accountant Merliyana Syamsul 
and Public Accountant Office (KAP) 
Satrio, Bing, Eny and Partners related 
to the results of OJK’s examination 
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of PT Sunprima Nusantara Finance. 
Regarding administrative sanctions, 
Mandiri Bank as one of PT SNP’s 
biggest creditors, must strive to sue 
KAP while waiting for a review 
from the Indonesian Institute of 
Accountants. The flow of this narrative 
raises questions, why did OJK provide 
administrative sanctions two days 
after the Minister of Finance gave 
administrative sanctions? It turned 
out that even though  OJK issued and 
administered POJK No. 13 of 2017 
concerning the Use of Public Accountant 
Services and Public Accounting Firms 
in Financial Services Activities, this 
POJK could not be used as a basis for 
decision making to impose sanctions 
on Public Accountants and / or Public 
Accountant Office.OJK apparently 
needs to wait for the decision of the 
Minister of Finance. The findings of 
the Center for Financial Professional 
Development (PPPK, which stands for 
Pusat Pembinaan Profesi Keuangan) 
shows that there are violations of 
professional standards in audits 
conducted on SNP Finance financial 
statements since the financial year 
2012 to 2017! Administrative sanctions 
provided by  OJK are exactly the same 
of sanctions given by PPPK through 
the Minister of Finance. OJK Status 
in this KAP case is the complainant 
or reporter to the Center for Financial 
Professional Development.
The results of the PPPK examination 
concluded that Marlinna and Merliyana 
Syamsul Public Accountants had not 
complied with the Audit Standards 
- Professional Standards of Public 
Accountants in the implementation 
of general audits of SNP Finance’s 
financial statements. The Auditing 
Standards and Professional Standards 
for Public Accountants include: (1) 
understanding of information system 
control related to customer data and 
the accuracy of financing receivable 
journals, (2) obtaining sufficient 
and appropriate audit evidence 
on Consumer Finance Receivables 
accounts and in believing the fairness 
of assertions of occurrence and (3 
) separate boundary assertions of 
Income accounts, (4) implementation 
of adequate procedures related to fraud 
risk detection processes and responses 
to fraud risks, and (5) professional 
skepticism in planning and conducting 
audits. Whereas the quality control 
system possessed by KAP contains 
weaknesses because it has not been 
able to properly prevent the threat of 
closeness in the form of a long enough 
relationship between senior personnel 
(audit team manager) in the audit 
engagement of the same client for a 
long period of time. The Ministry of 
Finance considers that this has resulted 
in reduced professional skepticism. 
The items adopted by the PPPK are 
the second point in the Strengthening 
Capital Markets Against Financial Fraud 
document(IOSCO, 2005).
In the case of BBKP, both as a 
bank and as a listed company, another 
problem that stands out is the issue of 
governance. The 2007 Limited Liability 
Company Law does not mention 
the GMS as the highest organ of the 
company, but the GMS is defined as 
the Organ of the Company that has no 
authority given to the Board of Directors 
or Board of Commissioners, one of 
which is the authority to appoint KAP 
to examine and provide opinions on 
the company’s Financial Report. In the 
process of procurement and selection 
of KAP, this authority was delegated 
to the Board of Commissioners. The 
selected Shorlisted KAP was given to 
the GMS to decide on its appointment. 
If there is a problem with the auditee 
during the audit process, the auditor 
should consult only with the GMS, but 
because the procedural GMS is held 
and takes at least 35 days before its 
implementation, KAP should consult 
with the Board of Commissioners. If 
and only if the Board of Commissioners 
cannot decide, it must be escalated 
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to the GMS. If conditions like this 
are not or have not been regulated 
in the Articles of Association or the 
Manual of the Company, the Board 
of Commissioners should think with 
adagias that ethics is beyond the law. 
Even this does not happen, because the 
closest EGMS held on January 10, 2018 
is the change of Directors in connection 
with the resignation of the President 
Director. 
On May 2, 2018, BBKP answered 
the question of the Head of the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange Valuation 
Division, among others revealed in the 
letter that the company had reported 
to OJK regarding the 2015 and 2016 
audited financial statements due to (1) 
adjustments to the presentation of credit 
card product receivables because there 
are abnormal credit card transactions 
generated by the system that are not 
in accordance with the accounting 
standards and internal provisions of 
the company (2) islamic financing/
receivables because of adjustments to 
the quality of financing and the impact 
on the formation of Allowance for 
Impairment Losses at Bank Syariah 
Bukopin (a subsidiary) (3) the process 
of restatement is in accordance with 
accounting principles. This restatement 
plan has been approved by the OJK 
by letter No. OJK. SR.14/PB.3/2017 
dated December 28, 2017. The problem 
is which OJK? Apparently from the 
OJK Banking Supervisor. Both the 
BBKP and the OJK so-called Banking 
Supervisor do not know enough about 
themselves, that Bukopin is supervised 
by OJK not only in its capacity as a 
bank, but as a public company. This 
is what the IMF (2017) calls “silos in 
OJK’s internal structure”.
Because in 2017 the OJK has issued 
POJK No. 13 of 2017 on the Use of 
Public Accountant Services and Public 
Accounting Firms in Financial Services 
Activities, another question arises, 
whether in examining the auditee 
KAP has carried out compliance with 
the letter (b) number (4) Article 20 by 
submitting incidental reports to the 
OJK in the event that they are found: (1) 
significant violations of the provisions 
of the laws and regulations carried out 
by the Parties Implementing Financial 
Services Activities (2) significant 
weaknesses in the control of the 
process of preparing and presenting 
financial statements of the parties 
carrying out service Finance (3) 
significant weaknesses in the internal 
control of the party that carries out 
financial service activities; and / or (4) 
conditions or estimates of situations 
that could endanger the continuity of 
the business of the party that carries 
out financial service activities.
Small cases up to the scandal 
presented above is an illustration of 
how weak the supervision is. Small case 
can be big, so no matter how small the 
case is, it should not be underestimated. 
Large cases are the accumulation of 
small cases, large stones will never 
make a person fall, but underestimation 
of small stones can make someone 
stumble and fall. There is no need 
to argue anymore, that scandals in 
the Indonesian capital market have 
existed since supervision was carried 
out by Bappepam; Bapepam; Bapepam 
LK and which is now known as OJK. 
The problem is before OJK conducts 
supervision, all kinds of costs that 
arise for the operation of Bappepam; 
Bapepam; Bapepam LK is a burden on 
the State Budget. But now, after being 
transformed into OJK, most of OJK’s 
operational costs are borne by SROs, 
institutions and professions, issuers, 
securities companies in the form of 
annual contributions. In the past when 
operational costs were still a burden 
on the state budget, the parties’ losses 
to the scandals that occurred only 
amounted to material losses. But now 
in it contains immaterial losses due 
to the argument “I have already paid 
the security guard, why can the thief 
still break into my house”. The main 
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cause of the OJK being soft, slow and 
tolerant of errors has been explained 
by itself through the Indonesian 
Financial System Stability Assessment 
document, IMF Country Report No. 
17/152. In the document, the findings 
underlying the conclusions are quite 
clear, as well as the problem solution. 
I will add some important points that 
are precisely in the IMF document not 
discussed as a source of OJK weakness.
2. Incompatibility of Investigation 
Functions in OJK Law with OJK 
Independence
Per se Law No. 8 of 1981 on the 
Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), 
investigators are state police officers of 
the Republic of Indonesia or certain civil 
servant officials who are specifically 
authorized by law to conduct 
investigations. The investigator gets 
the authority from the law to carry 
out a series of investigative actions in 
terms of and according to the manner 
regulated to search for and collect 
evidence that will make it clear about 
the crime that occurred and to find the 
suspect. 
As a consequence of carrying out 
functions as supervision of activities in 
the Capital Market, supervisors need 
to be given the authority to carry out 
checks on any Party that is suspected 
of having, is currently, or attempting to 
make or order, participate in, persuade, 
or assist in violating the Capital Market 
Law and or implementing regulations. 
With this authority, supervisors can 
have the authority to collect data, 
information, and / or other information 
needed as evidence of violations 
of this Law and / or implementing 
regulations. Violations that occur in the 
Capital Market are very diverse in term 
of types, modus operandi, or possible 
losses. Therefore, supervisors need to 
be given the authority to consider the 
consequences of violations that occur 
and the authority to forward them to 
the stage of investigation based on 
these considerations. Investigation 
in the Capital Market is a series of 
investigative actions to search for and 
collect the necessary evidence so that it 
can make light about the capital market 
crime that occurred, find the suspect, 
and find out the magnitude of the loss 
caused. Investigators in the Capital 
Market are Officials of Civil Servants 
appointed by the Minister of Justice in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
applicable legislation. Civil Servant 
Investigation Officials (hereinafter 
referred to as PPNS) officials are 
certain civil servants as referred to in 
the Criminal Procedure Code, both at 
the central and regional levels who 
are specifically authorized by law. 
The Capital Market Law (Law No. 8 
of 1995) has structural weaknesses 
because it was designed and made to 
be implemented and administered by 
Bapepam (also Bapepam LK) which 
is a work unit under the Minister 
of Finance, not by an independent 
institution such as OJK. Bapepam and 
also Bapepam LK which is a work unit 
chaired by echelon 1 officials from the 
Ministry of Finance who have Civil 
Servant Investigators.
Based on Article 1 number 1 of 
Act Number 21 of 2011 concerning 
the Financial Services Authority 
which reads: “The Financial Services 
Authority (OJK) is an institution that is 
independent and free from interference 
from other parties, which have the 
functions, duties, and authority of 
regulation, supervision, examination, 
and investigation as referred to in 
this Act “. Since it changed its form 
to OJK, both the OJK Law and the 
OJK structure, it is not possible 
to have investigators who own it. 
Because based on the Regulation of 
the Chief of the Indonesian National 
Police Number 20 of 2010 concerning 
Coordination, Supervision and 
Development of Investigations for 
Civil Servant Investigators, there 
are only two types of investigators: 
(1) Investigators are police officers 
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appointed and specifically authorized 
by law to conduct investigation; (2) 
Civil Servant Investigators (PPNS) are 
certain Civil Servants Officers based on 
the laws and regulations designated as 
Investigators and have the authority to 
conduct criminal investigations within 
the scope of the law which become 
their respective legal basis.
This is evident in POJK No. 
22 of 2015 concerning Criminal 
Investigations in the Financial 
Services Sector. In this POJK, OJK 
investigators are defined as follows: 
“OJK Investigators are Officials of 
the Republic of Indonesia National 
Police and / or Civil Servants Officials 
who are specifically authorized as 
Investigators, who are employed 
at OJK to Investigate Crimes in the 
Financial Services Sector as referred 
to in Act - Law Number 21 Year 2011 
concerning OJK. “ It is quite clear 
and clear that OJK is not independent 
because it depends on other agencies 
in terms of providing investigators.
The mechanism for borrowing 
PPNS from government agencies such 
as the Prosecutors and the National 
Police has made OJK no longer 
independent because it depends on the 
willingness of other agencies to lend 
investigators. On the other hand, if the 
investigators do not have it, then every 
time OJK finds its findings, it must act 
as a reporter to report to the Police or 
the Indonesian Prosecutor’s Office. 
OJK is not a ministry nor is it a non-
ministerial government institution that 
has the right to have PPNS. Therefore 
the Articles in Chapter XI of the OJK 
Law are not compatible with the 
independence of the OJK itself.
3. Deficiency of Violation Settlement in 
the Capital Market 
Prioritizing off-court settlement through 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration 
departs from an unstated assumption 
that not all violations of the Capital 
Market Law and / or its implementing 
regulations must proceed to the 
investigation stage because this 
can actually hinder the activities of 
bidding and / or the overall trading 
of Securities. Assumptions that are 
wrong because then in Chapter XV of 
the Criminal Provisions in the Capital 
Market Law it is stated that “Every 
Party that violates the provisions 
referred to in Article 90, Article 91, 
Article 92, Article 93, Article 95, Article 
96, Article 97 paragraph (1), and Article 
98 is threatened with imprisonment 
for a maximum of 10 (ten) years and a 
maximum fine of Rp. 15,000,000,000.00 
(fifteen billion rupiah) “. If the losses 
incurred endanger the Capital Market 
system or the interests of investors and 
or the public, or if there is no settlement 
of the losses that have arisen, Bapepam 
may initiate an investigation into the 
criminal prosecution.
4. Shortsighted and Myopic
At the Stock Exchange there are 20 state 
owned companies (not including soe’s 
subsidiaries), all SOEs are subject to the 
obligation to implement Partnerships 
and Community Development 
Program (hereinafter referred asPKBL) 
as mandated by the SOE Law. Because 
PKBL is not the same as corporate 
social responsibility, in terms of, PKBL 
is taken from the percentage of net 
income after deducting dividends, then 
all shareholders of SOE’s are affected. 
The formula for retained earnings does 
not originate from Net Profit minus 
only distributed Dividends, but after 
first having to be deducted by PKBL. 
Accounting, PKBL funds are treated by 
Entities Without Public Accountability 
(ETAP). Although it is treated as ETAP, 
PKBL Funds are owned by all company 
shareholders. OJK that administers 
the Capital Market Law forgets or 
shortsighted that in paragraph (2) 
Article 69 of the Capital Market Law it 
is stated that Bapepam can determine 
the accounting provisions in the 
Capital Market sector.
The financial statements of the 
PKBL Fund include those requested 
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by the Directors and Commissioners of 
SOE listed companies to the GMS. But 
to this day the OJK has never regulated 
the obligation to submit PKBL financial 
reports to all shareholders as well as 
the obligation to announce the financial 
statements of the related BUMN 
Tbk. More or less the same applies to 
several types of new capital market 
instruments such as the Asset Backed 
Securities Collective Investment 
Contract (KIK EBA) and Participatory 
Letter Asset Backed Securities (EBA 
SP) which must be listed on the stock 
exchange, but information about both 
types of instruments is nil because 
the OJK does not require the financial 
statements submission
4. CONCLUSSION
Supervising is one of the leading elements. 
Leading activities is aimed to achieve 
functional behavior from all the constituents 
they lead, namely achieving: transparency, 
accountability, responsibility, fairness and 
equality. In general, OJK as a financial 
sector supervisory institution has legiti-
mate power that comes from Law No. 21 
of 2011 concerning the Financial Services 
Authority. As a supervisor of the legitimate 
capital market, it also comes from Law No. 
8 of 1995 concerning Capital Markets. As 
a supervisor who has legitimate power, 
OJK instantly has coercive power. Every 
action from market constituents that lead 
to dysfunctional behavior, must be given 
a warning, penalty and punishment. 
Warning, the sentence must be announced 
in order to have a demonstration effect so 
that it is expected to cause a deterrent effect 
for other issuers. Who deserves legitimate 
power are those who have highest 
integrity  and expert power. The problem 
of weakness, softness, the slow pace of 
OJK besides coming from the problem of 
organizational structure is a problem of 
leaderships. The issue of organizational 
structure in the form of silo structure is 
not too difficult to solve, namely with an 
internal SOP that explains the distribution 
of power among commissioners (for 
example): who has the right to sign 
a violation decision or a Regulation: 
Chairperson of the Commissioner or 
Commissioner). Because being monitored 
is a business entity incorporated as a 
Limited Liability Company with all its 
inherited defects, the nature of supervision 
is absolutely departed from professional 
skepticism (not believing until proven); 
intrusive (at any time has the opportunity 
to come in situ). OJK’s dilemma is in the case 
of Civil Servant Investigators. Hiring PPNS 
will actually eliminate its independence 
because the OJK will immediately be 
classified as a ministry / non-ministerial 
government institution. Conversely, not 
having an investigator would make the 
FSA not like lame duck. With the weak 
condition of the OJK, market integrity 
cannot be entrusted as a whole to the OJK. 
The orderly and strong Bank Indonesia 
feels that it is necessary to have an organ of 
the Bank Indonesia Supervisory Agency, 
so for the weak and slow OJK, it is time to 
form an OJK Oversight institution.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1 
TABULATION OF CORRECTION AND REVISION
1 JAN 2016 – 31 DES 2016; 1 JAN 2017 – 31 DES 2017 & 1 JAN 2018 – 30 SEPT 2018
Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange
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TABLE 2 
COMPANIES THAT DO NOT SUBMIT 2017 AUDITED FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS 30 DAYS AFTER THE DEADLINE
No Ticker No Ticker
1 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food 18 GLOB Global Teleshop
2 APEX Apexindo Pratama Duta 19 TRIO Trikomsel Oke
3 ATPK Bara Jaya International 20 MTFN Capitalinc Investment
4 BIPI Benakat Integra 21 CKRA Cakra Mineral
5 BORN Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal 22 ARMY Armidian Karyatama
6 BTEL Bakrie Telecom 23 DAJK Dwi Aneka Jaya Kemasindo
7 CPRO Central Proteina Prima 24 MTYRX Hanson International
8 DEWA Darma Henwa 25 SSTM Sunson Textile Manufacturer
9 ELTY Bakrieland Development 26 GTBO Garda Tujuh Buana
10 ENRG Energi Mega Persada 27 KRAH Grand Kartech
11 ETWA Eterindo Wahanatama 28 SCPI Merck Sharp Dohme Pharma
12 MAGP Multi Agri Gemilang Plantation 29 GREN Evergreen Invesco
13 TAMU Pelayaran Tamarin Samuda 30 NIPS Nippres
14 UNSP Bakrie Sumatera Plantation 31 PPNX Perkebunan Nusantara X
15 MDRN Modern International 32 STTP Siantar Top
16 TRUB Truba Alam Manunggal Engineering 33 LCGP Eureka Prima
17 SAFE Steady Safe 34 ZBRA Zebra Nusantara
Company NameCompany Name
Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange
TABLE 3 
COMPANIES THAT DO NOT SUBMIT 2017 AUDITED 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 60 DAYS AFTER THE THE DEADLINE
No Ticker No Ticker Company Name
1 AISA Tiga Pilar Sejahtera Food 18 KRAH Grand Kartech
2 APEX Apexindo Pratama Duta 19 GREN Evergreen Invesco
3 ATPK Bara Jaya International 20 STTP Siantar Top
4 BIPI Benakat Integra
5 BORN Borneo Lumbung Energi & Metal
6 BTEL Bakrie Telecom
7 CPRO Central Proteina Prima
8 ENRG Energi Mega Persada
9 ETWA Eterindo Wahanatama
10 TAMU Pelayaran Tamarin Samuda
11 UNSP Bakrie Sumatera Plantation
12 TRUB Truba Alam Manunggal Engineering
13 TRIO Trikomsel Oke
14 MTFN Capitalinc Investment
15 CKRA Cakra Mineral
16 ARMY Armidian Karyatama
17 MTYRX Hanson International
Company Name
Source: Indonesia Stock Exchange
